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Abstract
Turkey experienced a severe economic and political crisis in November 2000, and again in February
2001. The IMF has been involved with the macro management of the Turkish economy both prior to and
after the crisis, and provided financial assistance of $20.4 billion, net, between 1999 and 2003. The offi-
cial stance is that the crisis was the result of the failure of the public sector to maintain the austerity tar-
gets and the failure to fully implement the free market rationale of globalization. I argue in this article,
however, that contrary to the official wisdom, the current economic and political crisis is not the end result
of a set of technical errors or administrative mismanagement unique to Turkey, but is the result of a series
of pressures emanating from the process of integration with the global capital markets. I document the
fragility indicators of the Turkish financial and fiscal system, and show that the IMF program led to an
increase in vulnerability of the financial system throughout 2000-2001. I further argue that the recent wave
of structural reforms destined for stability and credibility serve, in fact, mainly the interests of foreign
finance capital, and primarily aim at securing the debt obligations of the Turkish arbiters.
JEL classification: E6; F3; O1; O52
Keywords: economic and political crisis; Turkey; speculation-led growth; globalization; stabilization; IMF
conditionality
1. Introduction
At the turn of the millennium, the neoliberal orthodoxy juxtaposed a new set of condi-
tionality as part of its hegemonic agenda on the developing world: privatization, flexible
labor markets, financial deregulation, central bank independence, flexible exchange rate
regimes, and fiscal austerity. To this end, integration of the developing nation-economies into
the evolving world financial system has already been achieved through a series of policies
aimed at liberalizing their financial sectors and privatizing major industries. Furthermore,
the state apparatus had to be transformed to facilitate the hegemony of international finance
capital.
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The neoliberal ideology attempted to explain the motives behind financial liberalization,
arguing that such measures would restore growth and stability by raising savings and improv-
ing economic efficiency. Accordingly, as the “strangulation” of the so-called financial repres-
sion was dismantled, loanable funds would expand, real cost of credit would fall, and the
consequent increases in the pace of capital accumulation would generate sustained growth.
This claim, referred to as the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, provides the theoretical backbone
of the neoliberal ideology advocating financial deregulation and liberalization.1
The neoliberal dogma puts an almost religious faith in the stability characteristics of
free markets. In view of that, given the undistorted price signals of free markets (as well
as that of a “floating exchange rate regime”), market participants would, in an optimizing
framework, smooth out their expenditure plans, and the realized production and expenditures
patterns would be regarded as first-best outcomes. Thus, in a virtuous cycle of “financial
deepening,” international mobility of capital would help allocate savings and investments
more efficiently, reducing interest costs.
The real fact of life, however, has been quite a different story than the naïve and unreal-
istic models of imaginary capitalism envisaged by the neoliberal orthodoxy. Following
full-fledged financial liberalization, those developing economies that underwent financial
deregulation found themselves trapped within high and persistent real interest rates. They
also bore witness to a self-distorting foreign exchange market operating through attacks of
speculative hot money flows into the fragile and shallow asset markets, luring the residents
in a never-ending spiral of debt accumulation, increased dependence on imports, and jobless
growth patterns.
Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the postliberalization episodes were inflicted
with the divergence of domestic savings away from fixed capital investments toward spec-
ulative financial instruments with often erratic and volatile yields. As a result, developing
economies with weak financial structures and shallow markets suffered from increased
volatility of output growth, shortsightedness of investment decisions, and financial crises
with severe economic and social consequences. Often, the economic crises were realized
hand in hand with the ensuing political crises. All these led to severe contraction of labor
incomes and increased unemployment together with marginalization of the workforce.
The historical importance of these crises is also revealed in their significance as a seri-
ous blunder to the neoliberal orthodoxy rather than just a simple case study in pure
economic/political mishaps. The Turkish and the Argentinean crises, for example, which
occurred in the midst of IMF-directed adjustment programs, became the clearest examples
of how, in an indigenous economy, the unfettered workings of the myopic markets can
serve as the main source of instability through the speculative attacks of international
financial capital flows. Furthermore, with the recent attempts toward full liberalization of
the capital account under pressures from the United States and the IMF (the so-called
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1. See McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). For a review on the history of the rise of the neoliberal para-
digm as the hegemonic ideology in shaping macroeconomic policy, see George (2000).
2. The term Washington consensus was first coined by Williamson (1990) and then was reformulated in his
1993 article. Accordingly, a consensus on neoconservative economic policies emerged in the early 1980s that
reflected trade liberalization, price reform, deregulation, and privatization of state parastatals. This consensus,
he argued, “was shared by both the political Washington Congress and senior members of the administration
Washington consensus),2 governments lost their independence in designing a strategic mix
of the foreign exchange rate, the rate of interest, and fiscal policy as instruments for
promotion of industrialization/development targets. As open capital markets replaced reg-
ulated flows of foreign finance, governments became unable to use their traditional policy
instruments (interest rates, government expenditures, and exchange rates) unilaterally:
raising interest rates higher than world markets would trigger a large foreign capital inflow,
setting the stage for a financial crisis. Fixing them lower than world markets, however,
would trigger a large foreign capital outflow, generating the crisis directly. Similarly, set-
ting exchange rates higher than equilibrium levels could lead to a current account deficit;
fixing them lower than equilibrium would stimulate capital flight and investment abroad,
preparing grounds for a currency crisis. Finally, running a budget deficit to stimulate
growth or provide social programs more generous than the international norm is prone to
capital outflows. What is more, flexible exchange rates amplify the effects of these inter-
national capital flows by allowing speculation on foreign exchange markets that are exces-
sively large, excessively liquid, excessively volatile, imperfectly informed, and subject to
herd psychology.
After going through a series of short-term cycles of instability—crisis, (unsustained)
growth—throughout the 1990s, Turkey entered a period of severe economic-cum-political
crisis starting in November 2000. Even though the making of the Turkish crisis has been
the topic of many excellent analyses thus far,3 I find it pertinent to offer a thorough evalu-
ation of the official policies of crisis management before and during the crisis, and to eval-
uate the utilization of the IMF’s financial support from 1998 to date. Thus, rather than
a historical portrayal of events leading to the crisis of 2000-2001, it is the purpose of
this article to provide an in-depth analysis of the real (hidden) objectives of the economic/
social/political policies implemented under supervision of the IMF throughout the course
of the crisis.
The plan of the article is as follows: in the next section, I provide a brief overview of
the post-1980 liberalization path of the Turkish economy. In section 3, I review the condi-
tions leading to the 2000-2001 financial crisis, emphasizing the role of the IMF’s program,
and examine the financial and fiscal fragility indicators of the Turkish economy. Section 4
documents the composition of foreign debt and the extent of the IMF’s financial assistance
to Turkey. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
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and the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies of the US
government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks” (Williamson 1990: 28). The concept then was
revived and redressed in many situations during the 1990s, and after much prodding came to be referred to as
the augmented Washington consensus to oversee the new jargon of neoliberal orthodoxy such as financial pru-
dential regulation, central bank independence, inflation targeting, and governance. A thorough assessment of
the concept is provided in Rodrik (2002, 2003) and Broad and Cavanagh (2000).
3. See, for example, Akyüz and Boratav (2003); Boratav and Yeldan (2002); Yeldan (2002); Celasun (2002);
Alper and Öniş (2003); Cizre and Yeldan (2005); Voyvoda and Yeldan (2002); Turkish Independent Social
Scientists Association—Economics Group (2001); Ertugrul and Selçuk (2001, 2002); Gençay and Selçuk
(2001); Yentürk (2001); Uygur (2001); Boratav (2001); Ersel (2000); Yenal (2000); Celasun (2001); and Yeldan
(2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Most of the analyses on the crisis are presented at the International Development
Economics Associates (IDEAs) Web site, http://www.ideasnetwork.org; and the Turkish Independent Social
Scientists Association—Economics Group Web site, http://www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org/iktisatg.htm.
2. Financial Liberalization and Speculative-Led Growth in Turkey
Turkey’s post-1980 history of macroeconomic and political developments is observed
to suffer persistent difficulties and wide fluctuations in national income, with conflicting
policy adjustments. This observation parallels closely the overall thematic continuity of the
ambitious program of economic liberalization and market-led adjustments put into full
force during the early 1980s. At the turn of the third millennium, the most visible aspects
of the current Turkish political economy context are the persistence of price inflation under
conditions of a crisis-prone economic structure, persistent and rapidly expanding fiscal
deficits, the marginalization of the labor force along with the dramatic deterioration of the
economic conditions of the poor, and the severe erosion of moral values with increased
public corruption.
In Table 1, I tabulate the broad economic indicators and key macro prices of the Turkish
economy. The post-1980 Turkish adjustment path can be partitioned into two broad phases:
1981-1988 and 1989-2003. The main characteristic of the first phase is structural adjust-
ment with export promotion, albeit under a regulated foreign exchange system and controls
on capital inflows. During this period, integration into the global markets was achieved
mainly through commodity trade liberalization. More important, both the exchange rate and
direct export subsidies acted as main instruments for the promotion of exports and pursuit
of macroeconomic stability. The period was also characterized by a severe suppression of
wage incomes via hostile measures against organized labor. This “classic” mode of surplus
creation4 reached its economic and political limits by 1988. Coupled with a new wave of
populist pressures under approaching elections, organized labor succeeded in attaining sig-
nificant increases in wages. Real wages in manufacturing, for instance, increased by
90 percent in cumulative terms between 1989 and 1991. Furthermore, beginning in 1989,
there has been a major shift in the public expenditure accounts toward more socially desirable
ventures. An overall increase in both the share and level of public salaries, and investments on
social infrastructure, enabled the working masses to attain improved living standards.
The post-1988 structural shift could evidently be financed by taxing the bourgeoisie
and by moving toward a more “fair” tax system. Yet, the strategic preference of the state
was the maintenance of its present stance toward evasion of taxable capital incomes and of
its lax attitude toward the so-called unrecorded private transactions. In this sense, one can
easily argue that the strategic choice of the state to abstain from expanding its tax base over
capital incomes has long created a structural fragility in the fiscal accounts. Through this
mechanism, the appropriated surplus could have been kept within the confines of private
capital and, as such, has constituted one of the major sources of capital accumulation under
conditions of peripheral capitalism.
The main macroeconomic policy response to the increased wage costs and culminating
fiscal deficits was complete deregulation of financial markets. With the advent of elimination
of controls on foreign capital transactions and the declaration of convertibility of the Turkish
lira (TL) in 1989, Turkey opened up its domestic asset markets to global financial competi-
tion. In this setting, the Central Bank (CB) lost its control over the exchange rate and the
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4. Following Lippit (1985), I use the term surplus creation to refer to that portion of the GDP that is higher
than that which is necessary to meet the socially determined subsistence requirement. See Yeldan (1995) and


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































interest rate as policy instruments independent of each other because these practically turned
into exogenous parameters set by the chaotic conditions of financial arbitrage in the global
markets. Thus, many scholars regard 1989 as a crucial year, segmenting the post-1980 eco-
nomic development patterns of Turkey (see, e.g., Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse 2000; Yentürk
1997; Ekinci 1998).
Given this broad division, the Turkish economy is observed to go through four distinct
cycles of growth, crisis, and adjustment. (See characterization in Table 1.) The first covers
broadly the period 1980-1988, with its main attribute being the increased export orientation
of the economy. Following the foreign exchange crisis of 1977-1980, growth was reinvigo-
rated through the introduction of a structural adjustment program in January 1980 under the
auspices of the World Bank and the IMF. The period was marked with commodity trade lib-
eralization and export promotion along with price reform aimed at reducing the state’s role
in economic affairs. After the brief slowdown in 1988, the 1989 policy maneuver of capital
account liberalization served as one of the major policy initiatives to a new round of growth.
This policy maneuver paved the way for injection of liquidity into the domestic economy
in terms of short-term foreign capital (flows of “hot money”). Such inflows enabled, on one
hand, financing of the accelerated public sector expenditures, and provided, on the other
hand, relief from the increased pressures of aggregate demand on the domestic markets by
way of cheapening costs of imports. Consequently, the bonanza of cheap imported inter-
mediates fueled the second wave of the “growth crisis” cycle between 1990 and 1994.
Rising current account deficits (as a ratio to the GNP, from 1.7 percent in 1990 to
3.6 percent in 1993) and a drastic deterioration of fiscal balances (with the public sector bor-
rowing requirement [PSBR] increasing its ratio to the GNP from 7.4 percent to 12.1 percent
during the cycle) signaled the unsustainability of the post-1990 growth path. This prolonged
instability reached its climax during the fourth quarter of 1993, when currency appreciation
and the consequent current account deficits rose to unprecedented levels. With the sudden
drainage of short-term funds in the beginning of January 1994, production capacity con-
tracted, followed by continued fall in industrial output throughout that year. Together with
this contraction, the post-1994 crisis management gave rise to significant shifts in income
distribution and to an intensification of the ongoing processes of transfer of the economic
surplus from the industrial/real sectors and wage labor, in particular, toward the financial
sectors. Likewise, dollar-denominated wage costs decreased substantially and enabled
export earnings to rise. In fact, the disequilibrium could have only been accommodated by
the massive (downward) flexibility displayed by real remunerations of wage labor. (See
Figure 3.) Manufacturing real wages declined by 30.1 percent in the private sector and 18.1
percent in the public sector in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis. Concurrently, the average
markup rate in private manufacturing reached its highest value (47 percent) of the whole
post-1980 liberalization era.
Growth was reinvigorated after 1995. This third cycle was again characterized by mas-
sive inflows of short-term foreign capital (hot money) lured by attractive real rates of inter-
est and the appreciation of the TL. The cycle proved likewise unsustainable as the global
deceleration following the contagion of the Asian and Russian financial crises hit the
Turkish economy starting in August 1998.
To combat the increased instability and fight against the ongoing inflation, the CB and the
Undersecretariat of Treasury started to implement a disinflation program in December 1999
under the guidance and direct supervision of the IMF. The main elements of the program were
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the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, the implementation of a semicurrency board
regime by restricting the monetary expansion to increases in the net foreign assets of the CB,
and a policy of no sterilization5 to ensure rapid declines in the interest rate.
During the course of the program, the real GDP, which fell by 5 percent in 1999,
expanded at a rate of 7.6 percent in 2000, the fourth growth cycle, but drifted into negative
quarterly rates of growth following the first quarter of 2001. Of the expenditures over the
GDP, the deepest slump was witnessed in fixed investments, with contractions of –41.5
percent and –50.2 percent in the second half of 2001. Fixed investment expenditures were
observed to continue their contractionary trend during the first two quarters of 2002, with
real rates of growth of –26 percent and –1 percent.
The most direct indicators of the crisis over the financial markets were the rapid rate
of depreciation of the TL and the sudden hike of the rates of interest on the government’s
debt instruments (GDIs). After the second quarter of 2001, the TL–U.S. dollar parity
increased by quarterly rates of 96.5 percent, 116.5 percent, and 114.5 percent, and stabi-
lized only after November 2001. It was observed, however, that the rise in the real rate of
interest of the GDIs reached 117.5 percent in the first quarter of 2001.
Labor markets became once again the main absorber of the shocks of the crisis.
Manufacturing real wages took a toll by sharp decreases of 14.3 percent in the private sec-
tor and 11.3 percent in the public sector. At the same time, the open rate of unemployment
rose abruptly to more than 8 percent (see Figure 4).
Given reopening of the credit lines and resurgence of short-term foreign capital,
Turkey has reentered a new phase of growth driven by cheap imports and an overvalued
TL starting in 2002. In 2003, the TL was overvalued by more than 30 percent against the
U.S. dollar in purchasing power parity terms. Cost savings enabled by cheap foreign
exchange fueled import demand, and by the end of 2004, the Turkish current account
deficit had already widened to higher than 5 percent of GNP. It is not clear how long this
new (fifth) cycle of growth will last given rising external fragility and the volatile percep-
tions of financial investors.
2.1 Elements of Speculative-Led Growth
The increased dependence of the Turkish economy on speculative short-term capital
(hot money) flows during the post-1989 financial liberalization era is evident from the
above discussion. In fact, capital account liberalization in August 1989 increasingly forced
the Turkish economy to become dependent on the newly emerging financial cycles, and the
arbitrage-seeking inflows and outflows led to deepening external and domestic instability.
To highlight this dependent mode of economic growth, I portray in Figure 1 the move-
ment of net financial flows from the balance of payments data and contrast it with the growth
of real GDP. The figure underscores the observation that under the deregulated financial envi-
ronment, sources of growth originated not from domestic capital accumulation but from the
ad hoc and often irrational decrees of foreign (speculative) financial capital. In periods of
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5. Under this policy stance, the CB has announced that it would not conduct contractionary open market
operations to sterilize the inflow of foreign capital. Thus, given the programmed restrictions on domestic credit
availability, the rate of growth of the domestic money supply was effectively determined by inflows of foreign
capital. This had the effect of a “currency board” regime as in Argentina during the 1990s.
high inflows of financial capital, growth rates of the GDP tend to increase, yet periods of cap-
ital flight mean direct recession—even outright collapse, as in 1994, 1999, and 2001.
Under these conditions, whatever the growth performance of the economy during the
post–capital account liberalization, it had to be based on speculative-led patterns, a term
coined initially by Grabel (1995). Consequently, finance was elevated over industry and the
real sphere of the economy, and the financial sector drifted to the speculation of short-term
capital flows in a process that has been characterized as casino capitalism (Strange 1986).
Thus, after 1989 the growth performance of the Turkish economy is observed to fol-
low directly the direction of flows of foreign financial capital. In 2003 as well, the fact
behind the positive rate of growth is understood to be inflows of foreign capital. As a “new
emerging market,” Turkey is able to attract such capital inflows with the aid of high rates
of financial arbitrage that it offers in the international capital markets. This financial arbi-
trage can be calculated as the end result of an operation that first converts foreign exchange
into TLs at the initial rate of exchange and, after earning the rate of interest R offered in
the domestic asset markets, reconverts it back to the foreign currency at the then prevail-
ing foreign exchange rate. Algebraically, this net arbitrage gain is calculated as
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Figure 1.
Balance of Payments Finance Account + Net Errors and Omissions (Millions $)




Thus, during the course of this operation, financial speculators would gain the domes-
tic rate of R and lose at the rate of depreciation of the TL, ε. The net difference between
the two prices would give us the net financial arbitrage gain. I calculate the evolution of
such gains in Figure 2. Here, the main hypothesis is that the financial arbitrageurs would
invest their foreign monies in the domestic instrument that would bring the highest rate of
return in the domestic asset markets (in most cases, the GDIs).
According to the calculations portrayed in Figure 2, Turkey offered real rates of 80 per-
cent during the February crisis of 2001, 60 percent in December 2002, and 75 percent in the
summer of 2003, and thus became one of the leading emerging markets in the world of
financial speculation. Whereas the U.S. and OECD interest rates were at 2.5-4.0 percentage
levels, Turkey continued to offer arbitrage gains over dollar-denominated assets reaching
30 percent. Such returns enabled Turkey to attract huge sums of speculative finance capital
with a significant “hot” component especially during 2003 and 2004.
It would definitely be unrealistic to sustain fixed investments within an economy offer-
ing such rates of return to speculative financial transactions. As a matter of fact, in the
aftermath of the 2001 crisis, fixed investments virtually stagnated and did not exceed their
real 1998 levels as of 2004. I tabulate data on fixed investments in Table 2.
Such a transfer of financial surplus through very high real interest rates offered to the
financial system would, no doubt, call for repercussions to the primary categories of income
distribution. It is clear that creation of such a financial surplus would directly necessitate a
squeeze of the wage fund and a transfer of surplus away from wage labor toward capital
incomes, in general. It is possible to find evidence of the extent of this surplus transfer from
the path of private manufacturing real wages. I portray the dynamics of the private manufac-
turing real wages in Figure 3, denominated in both TL and U.S. dollar terms. The figure
further contrasts real wages against labor productivity.
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Figure 2.
Speculative Financial Arbitrage (%)
After a brief surge throughout 1990-1993, real wages had plummeted during the 1994
financial crisis and in a sense have borne the brunt of the adjustment of the crisis. During
1995-2000, private manufacturing real wages have kept their momentum in general,
although they could not recover their pre-1994 crisis levels. After the 2000-2001 waves of
crises, however, real wages in private manufacturing faced a second cycle of contraction.
This contraction was especially pronounced in U.S. dollar terms. In the meantime, pro-
ductivity gains in private manufacturing accelerated, especially after the first quarter of
2002. It is known that this productivity surge was due mostly to labor shedding (see Figure
4 on rates of unemployment) rather than increased labor efficiency originating from
advances in technology. As of the last quarter of 2003, the index of labor productivity
scored 1.77-fold higher than real wages in TL and 2.29-fold higher than the unit wage
costs in U.S. dollars.
A close inspection of figures 2 and 3 together is especially informative. This exercise
shows clearly how in the Turkish economy speculative financial gains were financed
through squeezing real wages. Each rapid rise in the financial arbitrage is closely associ-
ated with a downward movement of real wages and involves a direct transfer of labor
incomes toward capital, both domestic and foreign. The real wages contracted severely
after the February 2001 crisis, and this downward trend was maintained throughout 2002
and 2003. Calculated from 2000 to mid-2003, the decline in the private manufacturing real
wages reached 19.6 percent. The decline of wages in the public manufacturing sector has
been 15.4 percent during the same period. Viewed from a longer time horizon, if the index
Yeldan / Neoliberal Global Remedies 203
Table 2
Private Fixed Investment by Sectors, 1998-2004
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004a
1. Distribution by Sectors (%)
Real production sectors 28.3 30.4 28.3 33.4 44.4 47.6
Manufacturing 22.4 26.7 24.6 29.7 39.5 42.3
Agriculture and mining 5.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.9 5.3
Services 71.7 69.6 71.7 66.6 55.6 52.4
Transportation 19.7 26.2 23.4 26.0 17.0 21.0
Housing 36.8 23.7 23.9 17.0 14.4 11.8
Tourism 3.6 5.6 6.2 6.8 8.6 7.2
Othersb 11.5 14.1 18.2 16.6 15.6 12.4
2. Index of Fixed Investment
by the Private Sector (1998 = 100)
Private 100 89 64 55 66 93
Manufacturing 100 107 68 73 116 176
Transportation 100 119 73 72 57 100
Housing 100 58 40 25 26 30
Public 100 128 90 100 94 97
Total 100 99 69 66 73 94
Note: Total may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
a. Program forecast.
b. Energy, education, health, and other services.
of real wages were assumed to be 100 in 1997, it is observed that they fell to 82.2 index
points in the private manufacturing sector.
Parallel to these developments in the labor markets, there was a surge in unemploy-
ment rates. The open unemployment rate was 5.6 percent in 2000. In 2001, the official rate
of open unemployment rose to 8 percent and accelerated to 10.3 percent in 2003, staying
at that level since then. (See Figure 4.) More alarmingly, the rate of unemployment among
the educated urban young labor force was reported to reach 31.1 percent by the end of
2003. This ratio was 28.7 percent in 2001. Thus, the problem of unemployment persists
and is actually deepening in the absence of new investments and an ideological preference
toward contraction and austerity in the name of stabilization and debt repayments.
3. Financial and Fiscal Fragility of the Turkish Economy
At this point, I find it necessary to highlight the main causes and the structural sources
of the crisis in the Turkish context as an emerging market. The crisis, which first revealed
itself as a warning signal in November 2000 and erupted in full scale in February 2001, is
explained in the official circles and in the popular media as a result of “the failure of the
Turkish bureaucracy to implement the necessary structural adjustment reforms on time,
thereby disturbing the market agents and letting foreign capital to leave the country.”
This view, which portrays Turkey as a misbehaved student in the global markets, has also
been reflected in the official documents of the post–February 2001 crisis era and as such has
become the main ideological theme of the measures of new conditionality. As a vivid
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Figure 3.
Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Private Manufacturing
example of this official rhetoric, one can cite the words of Kemal Dervis, who resigned from
his post as a vice chair of the World Bank in the immediate aftermath of the February crisis
and has assumed a leading role as the new state minister: “with the implementation of a more
stringent fiscal policy, the crisis might perhaps have been alleviated. Unfortunately, the fis-
cal policy had not been strong enough, and the current account deficit widened.”6
According to this remark, the main source of the Turkish crisis was the rapid widen-
ing of the current account deficit. This interpretation, without doubt, is true given the
numerical indicators of the crisis. The current account deficit, which was $1.3 billion in
1999, erupted to reach $9.8 billion in 2000. The deficit in the current account, which
reached 4.8 percent as a ratio to the GNP, is one of the clearest indicators of the crisis. Yet,
the main issue here is to discuss the main reasons behind this deterioration, rather than
highlighting the deterioration itself, which is merely an end result. In fact, the proposition
set forth by Dervis accusing the lax fiscal administration as the main source of the current
account deficit does not fit with the facts. Data from the consolidated central budget and
other fiscal accounts clearly underscore that the public sector had not suffered from a
deficit exceeding the planned or foreseen magnitude and that during 2000 and 2001, the
Turkish government had in fact followed a strongly contractionary policy in terms of meet-
ing its overall expenditures.
Data on 2000 and 2001 consolidated budget revenue and expenditure realizations dis-
close that fiscal accounts were in line with targeted values. Fiscal data reveal that realiza-
tions of budgetary revenues exceeded their targets by 3.6 percent in 2000 and by 5.1
percent in 2001. Expenditures, however, are observed to be lower than their targeted limit
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Figure 4.
Open Unemployment Rate (%)
6. Panel presentation of Kemal Dervis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 27 February 2002.
by 0.2 percent in 2000 and exceeded their target only marginally by 1.7 percent in 2001.
Thus, during both years, the public sector succeeded in attaining its fiscal targets and
increased its noninterest (primary) budget surplus to 6.1 percent of GNP in 2000 and to 6.7
percent of GNP in 2001. This “success” in the fiscal balances was the direct end result of
the severe contraction in public investments and other social expenditures, as well as the
enactment of extraordinary earthquake taxes during 2000.7
Thus, the official/popular explanation of the crisis in terms of “excessive fiscal
deficits” is totally flawed and serves only as propaganda for masking the dynamics behind
the evolution of the crisis. Yet, a close inspection of the precrisis macroeconomic balances
of the Turkish economy clearly underscores that the continued volatility and disruption in
the economy should not be regarded as the results of a few technical errors in fiscal admin-
istration or bureaucratic mismanagement, but should be viewed as direct outcomes of the
neoliberal policies of the post-1980s that have sought to leave the domestic economy
defenseless against unfettered market forces, which are excessively myopic, excessively
erratic, and subject to herd behavior.
The 2000 disinflation program had, in fact, dispossessed the CB of its traditional tools
of austerity by limiting monetary expansion only to increases in the stock of net foreign
assets. According to this rule, the liquidity generation mechanism available to the CB prac-
tically meant a regime of a semicurrency board in monetary operations. Within this mech-
anism, monetary policy was restricted to the direction of foreign exchange flows, and, as
such, the most important element to be able to sustain the liquidity needs of the economy
relied on the continuation of inflows of international speculative financial capital. Thus,
operating under conditions of a freely open and unregulated capital account (since 1989),
the domestic rate of interest became totally dependant on availability of foreign capital,
and the domestic asset markets were left defenseless against speculative runs of financial
arbiters.
To be able to take better account of the disruptive mechanisms of this structural
fragility, one has to note the famous trilemma underlying an open economy that the inter-
national economists are fond of. In an open economy, the monetary authority can indepen-
dently choose only one of the three following instruments: the nominal exchange rate, the
interest rate, and the stock of money, leaving the determination of the other two to the inter-
play of market forces. As discussed above, liberalization of the capital account intrinsically
necessitates a higher rate of return on domestic assets in comparison to the rate of depreci-
ation of domestic currency against foreign currencies. This commitment stimulates further
foreign inflows, and domestic currency appreciates, inviting an even higher level of hot
money inflows into the often shallow domestic financial markets. The initial bonanza of
debt-financed public (e.g., Turkey) or private (e.g., Mexico and Korea) spending rapidly
escalates the acute fragility of shallow financial markets in the home country. Eventually,
the bubble bursts, and a series of severe and onerous macro adjustments are enacted through
very high real interest rates, sizable devaluations, and a sharp entrenchment of aggregate
demand, while the short-term hot money flows have already rushed out of the country, leav-
ing it broke and deprived of the traditional tools of adjustment and austerity. Elements of
this vicious cycle are further studied in Polanyi-Levitt (2001); Adelman and Yeldan (2000);
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7. See Ertugrul and Yeldan (2003) and Yeldan (2002) for further evidence and discussion on the fiscal per-
formance of the Turkish economy under the IMF’s 2000 program.
Calvo and Vegh (1999); Rodrik and Velasco (1999); Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés
(1995); Velasco (1987); and Diaz-Alejandro (1985), and are more recently referred to as the
Neftçi-Frenkel cycle in Taylor (1998, following Neftçi 1998 and Frenkel 1998).
In the context of the Turkish liberalization episode, the lure of uncontrolled flows of
speculative gains clearly unleashed all its might throughout 2000, during which currency
risk was eliminated and the whole liquidity generation mechanism was based on short-
term, hot money inflows. Yet, with the observed deterioration of macroeconomic condi-
tions, foreigners started to pull their financial capital out of Turkey. In the last week of
November 2000 alone, Turkish financial markets lost $5.3 billion via nonresidents’ short-
term speculative operations. In fact, with this rapid change of direction, net flows of non-
residents’ foreign capital would turn to –$8.7 billion after November. To these numbers
one should also add the monies taken out by the resident financiers. Data reveal that dur-
ing 2000-2001, residents transferred a net sum of $7.1 billion abroad.8 This means that fol-
lowing November 2000, Turkish asset markets’ loss of foreign exchange reached $31
billion ($15.2 + $8.7 + $7.1 billion) during the course of the crisis.
It is evident that, faced with these numbers, not only a financially shallow emerging
market economy such as Turkey, but no economy, could endure the disruptive conse-
quences of such financial shocks. Yet, the 2000 disinflation program completely ignored
the fragile conditions of the Turkish financial and asset markets, and exclusively disabled
both the monetary (the CB) and the fiscal (the Treasury) authorities from using their tra-
ditional tools of austerity by way of rendering them powerless against the speculative
forces of the markets. The crisis was, in fact, the end result of the culminating pressures of
this fragile environment.
As a concluding overview of this section, I can summarize the dynamics of the post-
1989 macroeconomic equilibrium of the Turkish economy with the aid of Figure 5. Low
savings along with stagnant investments, high fiscal costs and tax evasion, and an oligop-
olistic structure set the stage portrayed in Figure 5.9 It can be argued that these structural
traits were part of the Turkish economy throughout its history as a peripheral economy.
The resolution of these imbalances, however, disclosed quite different modes of adjust-
ment following the 1989 opening of the economy to global financial competition.
Important additions to the characteristics of the period were the wage explosion and the
reemergence of a populist stance against the background of intensified political struggle.
In response to these structural features, I observed the state assuming an active role in the
economic sphere, regulating the distribution of national output. The state carried out this
task first through its enterprise system by a mandated policy of delayed price adjustments
on the intermediates and the final wage and capital goods produced by the state economic
enterprises (SEEs; see Figure 5, box 3). Second, following the full deregulation of the cap-
ital account, the state actively participated in the domestic asset markets through its issues
of debt instruments (channels 6 and 7). This, together with the threat of currency substitu-
tion in the context of a convertible currency regime, necessitated high interest rates (chan-
nels 8a and 8b), the first vicious circle, and real appreciation (channel 9b).
The second vicious circle surrounding channels 9a, 9b, and 9c is highlighted by
double-sided implications among the three variables involved: short-term capital inflows
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8. Calculated from the balance of payments statistics, TR CB.
9. Figure 5 and the ongoing discussion are adapted from Boratav, Yeldan, and Köse (2002).
(hot money), real appreciation, and high real interest rates. Real appreciation had been the
prime cause of the rise of import volume and current account deficits. Real appreciation,
however, had a direct positive effect on investment demand by reducing costs of imported
capital goods and intermediates (channel 13b). This positive effect was countervailed by
the pressures of real interest rates (channel 13a), the end result being increased volatility
of investment demand. High interest rates gave way to inflationary pressures through
increased costs of credit (channels 8b and 13) and fed a speculative rentier type of accu-
mulation (channel 12) with consequent worsening of income distribution.
The limits of this bonanza of a “short-term, foreign capital–led growth pattern” were the
eruptions of the financial crises in 1994 and then again in 2001 as the ongoing fragility and
the onerous adjustments the domestic economy had to face continued in culminating cycles.
4. Portrait of the IMF’s Financial Assistance and Its Disposition
Turkey has used a total net sum of $20.4 billion from IMF funds since the beginning
of 2000. Through the course of using these funds, Turkey was conditioned to introduce a
set of measures that go beyond the standard policies of austerity and was directed to reori-
ent not only its economic but also its political apparatus. As a matter of fact, the new set
of policies, which was introduced formally on April 14, 2001, under titles such as national
program and then transition to the strong economy program (TSEP; Undersecretariat of
Treasury 2001), asserted that
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Figure 5.
Macroeconomic Dynamics of the Turkish Economy under Full Financial Liberalization (1989- )
Note: Figure adapted from Boratav, Yeldan, and Kose (2002).
the main aim of the program (was) to eliminate the instability due to lack of trust and to . . .
construct the necessary legal infrastructure so as to re-organize the public administration and
the economic decision making processes. Accordingly, it would . . . no longer be possible to
go back to the old ways of decision making.10
The current IMF program in Turkey relies mainly on three pillars: (1) fiscal austerity
that targets achieving a 6.5 percent surplus for the public sector as a ratio to GDP, (2) con-
tractionary monetary policy (through an independent central bank) that exclusively aims at
price stability (via eventual inflation targeting), and (3) structural reforms consisting of
many of the traditional IMF demands (privatization, large-scale layoffs in public enter-
prises, and removal of any form of subsidies).
Both the TSEP (Undersecretariat of Treasury 2001) and Letter(s) of Intent that fol-
lowed were administered under close supervision and financial assistance of the IMF. I
tabulate the detailed breakdown of these disbursements in Table 3.
Given the above data, it is understood that netting out the payments of capital until 2003,
Turkey received a total net sum of $20.4 billion from the IMF during the crisis. According to
the program conditions, $13.3 billion of this sum were used by the Treasury in budgetary
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10. Undersecretariat of Treasury (2001).
Table 3
Breakdown of the IMF’s Financial Assistance to Turkey, 1999-2004
July-December 1999 Staff monitored follow-up
2000-2002 Standby
November-December 2000 Extra reserve facility following the November 2000 crisis
February-March 2001 Extra financing in response to the February 2001 crisis
2002-2004 Standby
September 11 Extra financing due to the international crisis














Total payments US$8.827 billion
Net usage: total usage – payments
US$29.228 billion – US$8.827 billion = US$20.401 billion
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury (2001). I am further indebted to Nazif Ekzen for his invaluable help
for construction of this table.
finance of its domestic debt management, $7.5 billion were used by the CB in strengthening
its reserve position, and $1.1 billion were used by the Treasury in its own reserves. It was
also made clear by CB Governor Süreyya Serdengeçti that the resources obtained from the
IMF were to be used first and foremost in “successful management of the failed banks taken
under the control of the saving deposit fund, and to sustain the roll-over of the domestic and
foreign debt repayments” (Undersecretariat of Treasury 2001).
Again in this conjuncture, the government has decided to issue treasury debt instru-
ments (GDIs) totaling $8 billion plus TL4.3 quadrillion (approximately $4 billion) to the
failed banks taken under the control of the Saving Deposit Fund, and a total of TL25.8
quadrillion (approximately $25 billion) to the public banks that had experienced deterio-
rated asset positions due to “duty losses.” Thus, throughout the months following the erup-
tion of the February crisis, the government was observed to transfer an aggregate sum of
approximately $40 billion of fiscal resources to the banking sector. This sum reaches one
fourth of the aggregate Turkish GNP.
Thus, it is clear that the funds obtained from the IMF are to be used primarily by the
banking sector with the exclusive aim of “debt rollover.” In fact, a close inspection of the
patterns of foreign debt accumulation reveals the main attributes of this judgment firmly.
Table 4 narrates this issue.
Total foreign debt of Turkey increased to $147.2 billion by the end of 2003, up from
its level of $102.9 billion in 1999. Despite this rise in the aggregate debt stock, it is
observed that Turkey’s short-term liabilities of foreign debt have (been) reduced during the
course of the same period: the stock of short-term foreign debt that stood at $22.9 billion
at the end of 1999 and increased to as much as $28.3 billion at the end of 2000 was reduced
to $15.2 billion in 2002. It is understood that the underlying factor in this operation has
been the domestic banking sector’s performance in debt repayments. During this process,
total short-term debt stock of the banking sector had increased to $16.9 billion in 2000
from its level of $13.2 billion. Yet, following the crisis, they “succeeded” in bringing their
short-term debt down to $7 billion by mid-2002.
Thus, throughout the postcrisis adjustments, while the Turkish financial system increased
its total debt obligations with accumulated borrowings from the IMF, it was simultaneously
conditioned to repay its short-term debts to foreign creditors. And all of this was trumpeted
under the motto of “gaining credibility and trust in the foreign financial markets.” In other
words, the IMF-backed austerity program had primarily aimed at securing repayments of
Turkey’s short-term foreign debt and succeeded in achieving this outcome to a great extent.
5. Conclusion: Stability and Credibility for Whom?
It is clear that the 2000-2001 crisis administration in Turkey primarily worked as a
debt management program. In this sense, it is understood that the main purpose of the
IMF-led salvation packages that are hailed as big successes in the international media is
actually an operation of foreign debt rollover aiming at gaining the confidence of the inter-
national arbiters and financial speculators.
The tacit dilemma faced by the Turkish authorities is simple yet bitter: for output
growth to be continued, the economy became addicted to short-term foreign finance that in
turn necessitated relatively high real interest rates to be offered as a “new emerging market”
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in the global financial markets. Yet, high real rates of interest run counter to the objective of
debt sustainability via successful primary surplus operandi. Availability of cheap foreign
exchange lured by attractive real returns thus far has become instrumental in reducing costs
of imported intermediates and lowering inflationary expectations. It has also been the sole
source of output growth in an otherwise contractionary macroeconomic environment.
The fact that such sources of growth virtually depend on the speculative caprices of
the financial arbiters, and the increased fragility of the Turkish macroeconomic environment,
however, signal an unsustainable output performance for the days to come. Such “speculative-
led” characteristics of the Turkish growth cycle resemble the 1990-1993 and the 2000-2001
cycles of (unsustainable) growth/crisis/postcrisis adjustment, with bitter lessons that hopefully
should have been well understood by now. Yet, the pleasures of a cheap foreign exchange
bonanza together with high real rates of interest are too dear for the myopic speculators,
domestic and foreign alike, and the dangers of such speculation-led accumulation seem,
unfortunately, not to be appreciated yet by the so-called market participants.
I observe that what lies behind the colorful jargon of “effective and transparent gov-
ernment,” “good governance,” and “credibility” is a set of structural transformations to
ultimately satisfy the needs and demands of the financial capital centers rather than the
strategic requirements of the domestic economy. In essence, this model depends on the
contractionary monetary and finance policies, and assumes an open (i.e., dependent on for-
eign capital) economic structure ensuring the liberalization of international capital flows.
In this model, what is really meant by the concept of stabilization is establishing an
exchange rate system purified from devaluation risk and maintaining a high real return in
the national financial markets to attract inflows of foreign capital.
Neoliberal thought dictates that to take advantage of the benefits of “globalization,”
national central banks with autonomous monetary, interest, and exchange rate policies
should not be a hindrance to international capital flows. The real objectives of this philos-
ophy are to make the central banks be in charge of maintenance of price stability and
to sustain high real returns in national financial markets. In so doing, rents allocated
to finance would be secured. Public economics, however, is limited to take all measures
directly to enlarge the interest area of international capital.
Departing from all these observations, it is clearly seen that the IMF-led adjustment
program implemented in Turkey, with media propaganda that portrays it as “having no
alternatives,” is actually part of a larger project defining Turkey’s role in the new interna-
tional division of labor as a “new emerging market economy,” wherein industrialization
and development targets are abandoned, domestic commodity and asset markets are inte-
grated with the global markets under marginalized conditions, and the domestic economy
has been left unprotected and open to external shocks.
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